By Md Syful Islam, Ankara | 01 April 2026
Historical Context and the Constitutional Mandate
The fundamental foundation of a democratic state system lies in the consent, participation, and sovereign will of the people. A state truly assumes a democratic character only when the will of the people is given the highest status, not merely politically, but also legally and constitutionally. In the recent political context of Bangladesh, the historic uprising of students and the general public in July–August 2024 has emerged as a real and powerful expression of this principle.
Through this uprising, a fascist and authoritarian regime collapsed, creating a new possibility for restructuring the state. The universal political demand in the post-uprising period was the introduction of fundamental reforms to the state structure, so that no individual or group could again establish absolute power. In other words, the central objective of this movement was “the decentralization of power, institutional accountability, and the establishment of constitutional balance.”
To institutionalize this public aspiration, a “National Consensus Commission” was formed, with representatives from various political parties and civil society participating. After extensive discussions, a consensus was reached on 84 reform proposals, among which 47 were directly related to constitutional amendments. These proposals were formally signed on 17 October 2025 with the participation of political parties and emerged as the “July National Charter.”
The proposals in the July Charter aimed to restructure the architecture of state power. These included fundamental reforms such as limiting the Prime Minister’s powers, reconfiguring the President’s powers, establishing a bicameral parliament, expanding fundamental rights, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, and guaranteeing transparency in the appointment processes of constitutional institutions.
To ensure the implementation of this Charter, on 13 November 2025, the President issued the “July National Charter (Constitutional Amendment) Implementation Order, 2025.” Through this order, the Charter was brought within an effective legal framework, and the path was opened for obtaining direct public opinion.
In continuation of this process, on 12 February 2026, a historic referendum was held on the same day as the 13th National Parliamentary Election. According to the Election Commission, approximately 68.59 percent of voters cast a “Yes” vote in favor of the July Charter, expressing clear and unequivocal support.
From the perspective of a conscious citizen, the significance of this referendum is extremely profound. It is not merely a policy endorsement; rather, it establishes a new social contract between the state and the people. This direct mandate of the people clearly indicates that elected representatives are not only lawmakers, but must also take a second oath as members of a “Constitutional Reform Council” and complete the constitutional amendments in accordance with the July Charter within a specified timeframe. That oath has already been taken by the opposition.
Therefore, the result of this referendum cannot be viewed as an ordinary political opinion; rather, it is a clear constitutional directive, representing the direct expression of the sovereign power of the people.
The Referendum’s Authority vs. ‘Notes of Dissent’
The main argument presented by the current BNP-led government for not fully implementing the July Charter is that, during the deliberations of the National Consensus Commission, they had submitted ‘notes of dissent’ on several important provisions of the Charter. Therefore, according to their claim, based on a two-thirds majority in Parliament, they can implement reforms in accordance with their party position or electoral manifesto, and are not bound to follow the July Charter.
However, this argument is not only weak; it is constitutionally inconsistent, logically self-contradictory, and contrary to democratic principles. The invalidity of this position can be explained on the basis of three fundamental legal grounds. At this point, a basic constitutional conflict between popular sovereignty and claims of parliamentary supremacy becomes evident.
(a) Supreme Legitimacy of the People’s Will
Article 7(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh clearly declares that “all powers in the Republic belong to the people.” In light of this principle, all constitutional and legal structures of the state are ultimately founded on the will of the people.
When a specific document, in this case the July Charter and its Implementation Order, is directly presented to the people through a referendum and approved by an overwhelming majority, that approval is not merely ordinary political support; rather, it constitutes a direct sovereign mandate.
The legal implication of approximately 68.59 percent “Yes” votes is that the people have accepted the July Charter as a whole. This acceptance is not partial or conditional; it is complete. Therefore, no political party or parliamentary majority has the authority to reinterpret or limit this mandate.
According to constitutional theory, when the will of the people is expressed through a direct referendum, it acquires a higher normative status, which prevails over party manifestos or parliamentary decisions.
(b) Legal Ineffectiveness of ‘Notes of Dissent’
A ‘note of dissent’ is a procedural element, primarily used at the stage of drafting and deliberation to record differences of opinion among political parties. It does not constitute a final or binding legal position.
When a draft document, containing such dissenting opinions, is directly presented to the people through a referendum and approved, all prior procedural objections or differences automatically lose their legal significance.
In other words, this referendum cannot be viewed merely as a process of gauging public opinion; rather, it is a complete ratification process, through which the people have given the draft Charter its final and binding form. As a result, all previous ‘notes of dissent’ become effectively obsolete.
In this context, the mandate arising from such a referendum may be considered a non-derogable mandate, which cannot be reduced or altered by any political or legislative authority. Therefore, if any political party subsequently attempts to implement only parts of a referendum-approved document by invoking ‘notes of dissent,’ it will be considered a direct opposition to the people’s mandate.
(c) Doctrine of Necessity and Legal Contradiction
Another argument presented by the government is that the existing Constitution contains no explicit provision for taking an oath as members of a “Constitutional Reform Council” or for such a framework.
The fundamental weakness of this argument lies in its inherent contradiction. The interim government that administered the state after the July uprising, and the legal framework under which the election and referendum were held, were essentially based on the Doctrine of Necessity.
However, while the government accepts the results of elections held on that same legal basis and forms the government accordingly, rejecting the results of the referendum held on the same day and through the same process is a clear legal inconsistency.
In legal terms, this violates the principle of “approbate and reprobate,” that is, accepting and rejecting the same source at the same time. Additionally, another fundamental principle of law is estoppel, meaning that a party cannot take a contrary position after benefiting from an earlier position on the same matter.
Therefore, if the election is valid, then the referendum, being inseparably linked to it, is equally valid and binding. No constitutional or legal framework allows selective acceptance between the two.
Political Duality and Accountability Crisis
The rule of law and the Constitution does not depend solely on written provisions; it also relies on the political integrity, moral responsibility, and consistency of those who govern the state. In this context, consistency of political position is considered an important constitutional value. However, a comparative analysis of the past and present positions of the top leaders of the current ruling party regarding the July Charter, the referendum, and the constitutional reform process reveals a deep political contradiction.
The position that was adopted before the election to gain public support has been completely reversed after coming to power. This shift in stance with the change in position is not merely a political strategy; it directly calls into question the foundation of democratic accountability.
(a) Paradox in the Law Minister’s Stance
The current Law Minister of the government, Md. Asaduzzaman served as the Attorney General, the state’s chief legal officer, during the interim government. At that time, he himself provided legal advice in favor of issuing the Implementation Order of the July Charter and holding a referendum based on that order as part of the national consensus process. He had even opined that if the Constitutional Reform Council failed to implement the July Charter within a specified timeframe, it should automatically come into force based on the referendum result, and he had proposed the inclusion of a punitive mechanism.
However, after assuming power, the same individual is now describing that very order as unconstitutional. This is a clear legal and moral contradiction. An even more serious question arises in this context regarding the legality of his own appointment. On 6 August 2024, when there was effectively no functioning government in the country, his appointment as Attorney General was questioned in Parliament. If that appointment is accepted as valid under the Doctrine of Necessity, then denying the referendum and implementation process on the same basis is an evident double standard.
(b) Shift in Position of Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed
The current Home Minister, Salahuddin Ahmed, was initially skeptical about the referendum. However, he later adopted an important position, proposing that a referendum could be held by ordinance and that the result would be binding on Parliament. At that time, he argued on the basis of the concept of popular sovereignty that elected representatives would be bound to accept the people’s verdict.
However, after assuming power, his position has fundamentally changed. He now states that there is no basis in the Constitution for a reform council or implementation order, and that reform activities should be carried out through Parliament. This position directly contradicts his previous stance and reflects a lack of political consistency.
(c) Change in Position of State Minister Zonayed Saki
The current State Minister Zonayed Saki was one of the most vocal advocates for the implementation of the July Charter, the holding of a referendum, and the formation of a Constitutional Reform Council based on the referendum result. He publicly claimed that this process was an achievement of his political struggle and that if the “Yes” vote prevailed in the referendum, it must be implemented immediately.
However, after assuming office as a State Minister, a noticeable change in his position is observed. The very process he once presented as his political success has now become unclear in light of his current stance, particularly regarding the Constitutional Reform Council. Most significantly, he himself did not take the oath of that Council. This change clearly reflects a lack of political consistency and the influence of power.
(d) Ambiguous Position of State Minister Nurul Haque Nur
The current State Minister, Nurul Haque Nur, and his political platform have maintained a shifting position on the referendum and the July Charter since the dialogue phase. At one stage, they strongly supported holding a referendum and issuing an implementation order to provide a legal basis for the Charter. However, after assuming ministerial responsibility, their position on three fundamental issues, the referendum, the implementation order, and the Constitutional Reform Council, has become unclear. Such a stance not only creates political uncertainty but also conveys a confusing and unreliable message to the public.
Taken together, these examples highlight a significant reality. The ruling government has treated the July Charter and the referendum not as principled commitments but as political tools. The position adopted before the election to gain public support has been abandoned after coming to power, in an apparent attempt to avoid accountability.
In constitutional terms, this amounts to a clear breach of public trust. In a democratic state, changes in political position may be normal. However, when such changes directly contradict the explicit mandate of the people, they cease to be strategic and instead pose a threat to the fundamental structure of democracy.
These dual positions are not isolated or individual inconsistencies; rather, they reflect a consistent pattern of political behavior in which prior commitments are deliberately reinterpreted or abandoned after assuming power. In this context, citizens had developed a legitimate expectation that the promises made before the election and the positions supported in the referendum would be implemented once in power. The violation of this expectation undermines the credibility of democratic governance.
A fundamental principle of democratic governance is good faith, where the government sincerely attempts to fulfill its commitments to the people. The current position is not consistent with that principle. As a result, a clear accountability deficit emerges, where political leadership shifts from its prior stance without providing any institutional or legal justification.
The July Charter vs. Party Power Politics
The political contradictions discussed above are not merely behavioral; rather, they reflect a deeper theoretical and structural conflict, which is analyzed below.
(a) Reform Philosophy vs. Party Agendas
At the core of this conflict lies the tension between the “public aspiration” of the July uprising and the long-standing traditional political culture. The central philosophy of the July Charter was the decentralization of power to ensure citizen participation at all levels, including the grassroots. However, the positions of major political parties suggest that they place greater importance on maintaining continuity of power and party control than on implementing reforms. As a result, the proposed constitutional reform process risks turning into a zero sum game, where reconciling the interests of major parties and public demands becomes difficult.
(b) Article 70: Party Loyalty vs. Conscience Voting
Article 70 of the Constitution, which restricts Members of Parliament from voting against their party, has sparked significant disagreement during the reform process.
The vision of the July Charter emphasizes the right of Members of Parliament to vote independently in special circumstances, such as constitutional amendments or states of emergency. This is intended to prevent the legislature from becoming a mere rubber stamp of the executive.
On the other hand, BNP maintains a strict position in favor of retaining Article 70. Their argument is that party discipline is essential for parliamentary stability. However, from an academic perspective, this provision fundamentally impedes MPs’ ability to express independent opinions and effectively places their political fate in the hands of the party leadership, increasing the risk of parliamentary autocracy.
Contested Provisions vs. The Referendum Verdict
Within the unified draft prepared by the National Consensus Commission, a total of 84 decisions were adopted, of which 14 key issues attracted objections or ‘notes of dissent’ from various political parties. Among these, the largest number of objections, 9 in total, were raised by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its aligned political groups, which currently hold an overwhelming parliamentary majority.
Given that BNP commands more than two-thirds majority in Parliament and that the passage of any proposal within the reform council requires 151 votes, the party possesses the numerical capacity to reject or modify the provisions to which it objected. However, the referendum, in which more than 48 million voters approved it with a “Yes” vote, introduces a distinct and competing source of constitutional authority. This gives rise to a structural tension between a directly expressed popular mandate and subsequent party-based objections advanced within representative institutions.
The content of this tension becomes clearer when the substance of the approved reforms is examined alongside the dissenting positions. At the level of executive structure, the referendum endorsed limitations on the concentration of power by restricting the tenure of the Prime Minister to two terms and by separating the office of the head of government from that of party leadership. The opposing position, which supports the continuation of unified party and executive leadership, reflects a preference for maintaining concentrated political authority within a single locus.
A similar divergence is evident regarding the distribution of appointment powers. The referendum approved a recalibration of executive authority by enabling the President to make independent appointments in key institutions, including regulatory and oversight bodies such as Bangladesh Bank and the Energy Regulatory Commission. The objections raised to these provisions, particularly regarding financial and regulatory appointments, indicate a preference for preserving executive control over strategically significant institutions.
In the legislative sphere, the introduction of a bicameral system with proportional representation in the upper chamber reflects an effort to broaden political inclusion and reduce majoritarian dominance. Resistance to this arrangement, combined with a preference for party-based nomination, suggests a model of legislative organization in which political representation remains tightly mediated through party structures rather than diversified through electoral mechanisms.
The disagreement concerning Article 70 further illustrates a fundamental constitutional divide. The referendum-oriented reforms seek to permit limited instances of independent voting by Members of Parliament in order to enhance legislative accountability. The opposing position, which insists on strict party discipline even in matters such as constitutional amendment, reinforces a conception of Parliament as institutionally subordinate to party authority.
In relation to electoral governance, the proposal to dissolve the caretaker government upon the assumption of office by the newly elected Prime Minister reflects an attempt to formalize the transition process within a defined constitutional framework. The contrary position, which favors retaining parliamentary discretion over the formation and dissolution of such arrangements, indicates a preference for maintaining control within majority-driven processes.
The contrast is equally pronounced in the domain of constitutional institutions. The referendum endorsed granting independent rule-making authority to bodies such as the Public Service Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the Anti-Corruption Commission. The objections to these provisions suggest a reluctance to fully detach these institutions from executive influence.
Finally, the proposed mechanism for appointing the Ombudsman through a two-thirds majority-based selection process seeks to institutionalize consensus in key accountability appointments. Opposition to this model reflects a preference for retaining partisan influence over such processes.
Taken together, these positions reveal a consistent pattern. The reforms approved through the referendum are oriented toward the decentralization of power, the strengthening of institutional independence, and the establishment of effective constitutional checks and balances. By contrast, the dissenting positions, across multiple domains, tend to favor arrangements that preserve or reconsolidate authority within executive or party-controlled structures.
From a constitutional perspective, this divergence cannot be reduced to ordinary policy disagreement. Rather, it reflects competing conceptions of constitutional order: one grounded in the diffusion and limitation of power, and the other in its concentration within majoritarian and party-centered frameworks.
The legal significance of the referendum lies precisely in its articulation of the former as the expressed will of the people. As such, the attempt to give effect to dissenting positions that contradict this mandate raises a fundamental constitutional question concerning the hierarchy of authority within the system. It calls into issue whether a directly expressed popular mandate, endorsed through a nationwide referendum, can be subordinated to subsequent party-based preferences within Parliament.
Accordingly, the issue at stake is not merely the implementation of particular reform provisions, but the broader trajectory of the constitutional order itself. It concerns whether the state will move toward a framework characterized by decentralized authority and institutional balance, or revert to patterns of centralized control that the referendum-approved reforms were designed to address.
Constitutional Implications and Upholding the Mandate
From a constitutional and doctrinal standpoint, the referendum establishes a form of direct popular sovereignty that carries binding normative force within the constitutional order. The approval of the July Charter by a clear majority of voters signifies not merely political endorsement, but a definitive act of constitutional authorization.
First, the referendum result indicates acceptance of the Charter in its entirety. As such, any attempt to selectively implement or reinterpret its provisions would raise serious questions regarding fidelity to the expressed will of the people. In constitutional terms, the mandate operates as a unified authorization rather than a divisible or negotiable set of preferences.
Second, prior procedural objections, including notes of dissent recorded during the drafting phase, lose their independent legal relevance once the text has been ratified through a direct popular vote. The referendum functions as a conclusive act of validation, thereby superseding earlier disagreements embedded within the deliberative process.
Third, the institutional mechanisms envisaged for implementation, including the formation and functioning of a Constitutional Reform Council, derive their legitimacy from the same popular mandate. Accordingly, delays or refusals to operationalize such mechanisms may be viewed as inconsistent with the obligation to give effect to a constitutionally validated outcome.
Fourth, the presence of a parliamentary supermajority does not, in itself, justify a departure from a directly expressed popular mandate. While parliamentary authority remains central within a representative system, it operates within limits defined by constitutional principles, including the supremacy of the people as the ultimate source of authority.
Fifth, the integrity of the reform process requires adherence to principles of transparency, participation, and institutional independence. These elements are not merely political preferences but are integral to the constitutional vision endorsed through the referendum.
Finally, where a constitutionally endorsed reform process is delayed or obstructed, the question of enforcement mechanisms becomes legally significant. The notion of an automatic or self-executing effect, grounded in the referendum result, reflects an attempt to ensure that the people’s mandate is not rendered ineffective through procedural inaction.
Collectively, these considerations suggest that the referendum creates a binding constitutional expectation that the July Charter will be implemented in good faith, in full, and within a reasonable timeframe. Any deviation from this trajectory would require a strong constitutional justification; failing that, it risks undermining the normative authority of popular sovereignty within the constitutional framework.